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Not Just Smoke and Mirrors: Free
Expression and EC Restrictions on Tobacco
and Alcohol Advertising
Paul Robbennoltt
In October 1989, the European Economic Community ("EC"
or "Community") adopted the "Television Without Frontiers" Directive.' This Directive enables broadcasters to transmit within the
Community without concern for compliance with individual Member State regulations. The Directive seeks to standardize the regulation of television advertising within the Community,2 removing
national differences that distort competition and impede trade.'.
Moreover, concern for the health and welfare of Community citizens led to the adoption of articles 13 and 15 of the Directive,
which ban tobacco product advertisements and restrict the advertisement of alcoholic beverages on television."
Although these restrictions seem somewhat severe, they are
largely redundant: the countries of Western Europe already ban
tobacco advertisements, and the restrictions placed on the advertisement of alcohol products by the industry itself are at least as
t B.A. 1990, Macalester College; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
Council Dir 89/552, 1989 OJ L298:23-30.
Id at L298:24.
3 Steven Prokesch, Selling in Europe: Borders Fade, NY Times D1 (May 31, 1990).
Article 13 of the Directive states: "All forms of television advertising for cigarettes
and other tobacco products shall be prohibited." Council Dir 89/552, art 13, 1989 OJ at
L298:28 (cited in note 1).
Article 15 requires television advertising of alcoholic beverages to comply with the following criteria:
(a) it may not be aimed specifically at minors or, in particular, depict minors consuming these beverages;
(b) it shall not link the consumption of alcohol to enhanced physical performance
or to driving;
(c) it shall not create the impression that the consumption of alcohol contributes
towards social or sexual success;
(d) it shall not claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities or that it is a stimulant, a sedative or a means of resolving personal conflicts;
(e) it shall not encourage immoderate consumption of alcohol or present abstinence or moderation in a negative light;
(f) it shall not place emphasis on high alcoholic content as being a positive quality
of the beverages.
Id, art 15, 1989 OJ at L298:28.
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stringent as the Directive's guidelines.5 However, the EC has considered, and continues to consider, extending such guidelines to
other products and media.' Further, the European Commission has
proposed a flat ban on the advertisement ,of tobacco products in all
media.7 These latter proposals are quite controversial, and the alcohol and tobacco industries are devoting substantial efforts to defeat them.
In the United States, advertising regulation is circumscribed
by the First Amendment, which affords commercial speech limited
constitutional protection. Commercial speech in the EC also enjoys
protection. However, assessing the broadcast Directive according to
European free speech principles is somewhat complicated, due to
both the supranational character of EC law and the absence of an
explicit Community right of free expression. Nevertheless, this
Comment argues that because the EC has incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR")-particularly Article 10, which guarantees freedom of expression-as part of its law,
the Community must accord commercial speech the proper degree
of protection. Accordingly, although the EC has attempted to fit its
tobacco and alcohol advertising restrictions within the provisions
of the ECHR, this Comment argues that such restrictions cannot
be reconciled with ECHR Article 10.
Part I of this Comment outlines the regulation of commercial
speech in the United States, focusing primarily on the restraints
placed on regulators by the First Amendment. Part II examines
European protection of free expression under the ECHR as a basis
for ECJ jurisprudence. Part III concludes the analysis by examining Directive 89/552 in light of the ECHR, arguing that the Directive's restrictions violate EC free expression principles.
I.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, the First Amendment limits the restrictions government may place on advertisers.' Yet, this was not all Laurel Wentz, EC Pleases TV Advertisers; BroadcastingLimits Are Eased, Advertising Age 56 (Oct 16, 1989).
6 Thus, an early version of the Directive included an outright ban on the advertisement
of alcohol products on television. Id.
' Comparative Advertising, The Economist 79 (May 18, 1991).
8 The First Amendment provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
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ways so; indeed, until quite recently the Supreme Court did not
include advertising within the scope of speech protected by the
First Amendment.' In 1975, however, in Bigelow v Virginia, the
Supreme Court began to rethink the question of whether commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.1 ° Although the Court did not fully elaborate the extent of First
Amendment protection," its decision in Bigelow clearly established that the existence of commercial activity alone did not remove speech from First Amendment protection. 12 The Court reasoned that both the interests of the advertisers as speakers and the
value of advertising as a source of consumer information required
such a result." "Thus, in this case, [the advertiser's] First Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the
general public." 4
The Court has subsequently reaffirmed this holding. For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., decided in the term following Bigelow, the
Court offered its strongest statement in favor of protecting commercial speech. 5 At issue in the case was a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription
drugs. The Court emphasized the interests of the individual and
society in commercial speech as a source of information assisting
consumer decisionmaking.16 Instead of restricting advertising for
US Const, Amend I.
' For example, in 1942, the Court, in Valentine v Chrestensen, 316 US 52 (1942),
upheld a New York city ordinance forbidding the distribution of commercial advertising on
its streets, despite the fact that the pamphlet in question, which advertised free tours of a
submarine, contained a political statement protesting the city's refusal to allow the promoter the use of wharf facilities. Id at 53-55. The Court did not explain why commercial
speech was not protected by the First Amendment; it simply said that such regulation was a
question for the legislature. Id at 54.
0 421 US 809 (1975). In Bigelow, the Court upheld the right of a Virginia newspaper to
advertise low-cost placements in clinics and hospitals in New York for women with unwanted pregnancies.
" The Court, for example, did not decide the "precise extent to which the First
Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may
legitimately regulate or even prohibit." Id at 825.
I" Id at 809, 818.
13 Moreover, such advertisements also served those with an interest in the legal status
of abortion in another state and its implications for the reform of Virginia law. Id at 822.
" Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US at 822.
425 US 748 (1976).
Justice Blackmun noted that in many cases advertising can be as important as political speech: "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
• . .may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." Id at 763. He also relied on Bigelow to support the recognized need for according
commercial speech First Amendment protection. Id.
"

16
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paternalistic reasons, the better policy is to allow the free flow of
commercial information, "assum[ing] that this information is not
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests
if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
17
close them.
However, even in such a case, the Court cautioned that commercial speech was not entitled to unqualified First Amendment
protection. States could still regulate commercial speech for legitimate public ends-for example, if the advertisement was false or
fraudulent, if the commodity or service advertised was illegal, or if
the advertisement violated others' privacy rights.18 In addition,
states might legitimately regulate commercial speech for two other
reasons. First, as with other types of speech, reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions do not violate the First Amendment
as long as they are content-neutral, serve a significant state interest, and alternative channels for conveying the affected information exist."9 Second, states may legitimately require advertisers to
provide additional information, warnings, or disclaimers to prevent
them from misleading consumers.2" More importantly, the Court
also held that the special nature of electronic media may necessitate special restrictions on advertising.21
In recent years, the Supreme Court has scaled back the protection commercial speech receives under the First Amendment. In
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v Public Service
Commission of New York, 2 the Court outlined a four-step test to
determine when commercial speech is protected. To receive First
Amendment protection,
[C]ommercial speech . . . at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmenId at 770. The Supreme Court followed this decision in 1977 with Carey v Population Services International,431 US 678 (1977), in which the Court upheld the right of

distributors to advertise contraceptives.
S See Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US at 828.
" Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US at

771.
Id at 771-72 n 24.
" Bigelow, 421 US at 825 n 10. See also, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 US at
20

773.
" 447 US 557 (1980).
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tal interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive
23
interest.
that
serve
to
than is necessary
Therefore, commercial speech receives less protection than other
forms of expression,24 enjoying First Amendment protection only
insofar as it serves the legitimate interests of the speaker, consumer and society.25
In order to answer the first Central Hudson question, a court
must look to the nature of the advertising: if the advertisement is
likely to deceive the public rather than inform it, or if the advertisement is related to unlawful activity, it is not protected and is
subject to state regulation. In the absence of a risk of deception or
encouraging illegal activity, the government must show a substantial interest to justify restricting commercial speech.26 State regulatory power is further restricted in that there must be a fairly close
fit between the ends sought and the means employed, and the
means employed must be the least restrictive ones available.
Although the Court continues to use the Central Hudson test,
the protection accorded commercial speech has been further reduced by a strict reading of the least-restrictive-means requirement. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Company
of Puerto Rico, the Court held that a regulation need only be "no
more extensive than necessary"-not the least28 restrictive
means-in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
This erosion of commercial speech protection has facilitated
state and federal efforts to restrict tobacco product advertising. In

2'

Id at 566.
Id at 563.
Id at 561-62.

2

Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporationv Public Service Commission of New

13
24

York, 447 US at 564.
17 Id. Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment, criticized this test as
insufficiently protective of commercial speech that is not misleading or fraudulent. His opinion is highly critical of speech restrictions that are enacted in order to achieve a non-speech
purpose, such as decreasing the sale and use of a product:
I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability
and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to
"dampen" demand for or use of the product.... [Sluch a regulatory measure
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt
by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct
regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free
choice.. . . [T]he State's policy choices are insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citizens is molded by
the information that government chooses to give them.
Id at 573 (Blackmun, concurring in judgment).

28

478 US 328, 343-44 (1986).
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fact, federal law prohibits companies from advertising tobacco
products on television.2 9 This ban was upheld as constitutional in
Capital Broadcasting Co. v Mitchell. ° In that case, the District
Court noted first that commercial speech receives less protection
than other forms of expression."1 Moreover, the court reasoned
that because electronic media are more susceptible to public interest regulations-the public owns the airwaves, whereas the print
media is generally privately owned-the prohibition on tobacco advertising was constitutional.32 The court further concluded that the
ban did not violate the petitioners' First Amendment rights because they were broadcast licensees and not advertisers, and were
therefore not prohibited from speaking on the issue of smoking;
they merely "lost an ability to collect revenue from others for
''
broadcasting their commercial messages. 11
Courts have also given states broad power to regulate alcohol
advertisements. 3 This power is based upon an interpretation of
the Twenty-first Amendment that confers broad power on the
states to regulate matters that concern alcoholic beverages.35

2
30

Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 USC § 1335 (1970).
333 F Supp 582 (D DC 1971), aff'd 405 US 1000 (1972).

Advertising restrictions such as those in Capital Broadcasting and Posadas involve
products, the sale of which could be regulated. In Posadas,the Court explained that restrictions are justified:
[Ilt is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct [gambling] that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising. . . . Legislative regulation of products
or activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, has varied from outright prohibition on the one hand, . . to legalization of
the product or activity with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other
hand ....
Posadas, 478 US at 346 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
Capital Broadcasting Co. v Mitchell, 333 F Supp at 584.
"
Id at 584, 586.
8 Id at 584.
See Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n. v Crisp, 699 F2d 490 (10th Cir 1983), rev'd, Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v Crisp, 467 US 691 (1984); Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n. v
Attorney General of Michigan, 142 Mich App 294, 370 NW2d 328 (Ct App 1985).
Is "If there is any instance where a state can escape First Amendment constraint while
prohibiting truthful advertising promoting lawful sales, it would be where the product being
sold is intoxicating liquor." Dunagin v Oxford, 718 F2d 738, 743 (5th Cir 1983). "[B]ecause
any restriction on the advertisement of liquor itself is necessarily related . . . to liquor regulation, restrictions placed upon that advertisement by the states are consistent with the
First Amendment." Id at 745.
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II.

EUROPEAN FREE SPEECH LAW

A. The EC
The EC does not have any explicit charter or law that guarantees the right of free speech. This omission is explained by the fact
that the EC's original mission was conceived of in primarily economic terms; individual rights were thus beyond the immediate
concern of Community founders.36 However, Community Member
States have a rich heritage of free expression principles upon
which to draw.3
Nonetheless, the Community has also begun to recognize the
importance of political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, to economic integration. Thus, in a series of decisions
dating from the late 1960s, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
has established a set of "general principles" of Community law.
The court's decisions "created a higher law superstructure of fundamental human rights

. . .

against which the acts of the Commu-

nity organs could be reviewed in the normal course of judicial review provided by the Treaty. ' 38 Although not explicitly listed in

the Treaty of Rome, Community courts recognize the binding force
of these fundamental freedoms.
The ECJ first recognized the existence of such general principles in Stauder v Ulm.3 9 In Stauder, a Community measure estab-

lished lower prices on butter for certain individuals who qualified
as needy, as long as the beneficiary revealed his name. The plaintiff challenged the scheme on the basis that it violated his fundamental rights by requiring him to identify himself."' The ECJ recognized the existence of unwritten "general principles of

"6 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal
Order of the European Communities, in Rudolf Bernhardt and John Anthony Jolowicz, eds,
InternationalEnforcement of Human Rights 113, 115 (Springer-Verlag, 1987).
" Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the International "Free Flow" of Information, 30. Va J Intl L 371, 413. See, for example, FRG Basic Law, Art 5,
1, 2 (1949). The
Basic Law of Germany states:
Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by
speech, writing and pictures and freely inform himself from generally accessible
sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts
and film are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
These rights are limited by the provision of the general laws, the provisions of law
for the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honor.
W8
Weiler,
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights at 114 (cited in note 36).
3 Case 29/69, 1969 ECR 419.
'0 Id at 421..
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Community law" that must be considered when determining the
validity of EC measures."1
The ECJ further refined its commitment to fundamental freedoms in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle Getreide.'2 The plaintiff in this case challenged an agricultural import licensing deposit requirement on the basis that the
plaintiff's fundamental right to economic liberty was violated."3 Although the court rejected the plaintiff's challenge, it strongly reaffirmed the importance of general principles of law in the EC and
called respect for fundamental rights "an integral part" of those
principles.'
The ECJ solidified its concept of fundamental rights in Nold v
Commission, reiterating that these rights constitute an integral
part of the general principles of law protected by the ECJ.4e The
ECJ identified two possible sources for these rights: the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and international
treaties in which all the Member States are signatories or participants.' The court specified the European Convention on Human
Rights as one such international treaty.'8
The ECHR is an international agreement among 22 states, including all of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome and subsequent Member States of the EC. In fact, although the ECJ draws
upon many different sources for these "general principles," the
ECHR represents one of the most important sources.' ° The importance of the ECHR should not be underestimated: "it gives the
Court [of Justice] a concrete source-akin to the American Bill of
Rights-on which to build its own normative basis.

' 50

Further-

more, the Court of Justice has stated that it will look to the Convention in any situation in which individual rights protected by
that document are implicated. 1
* Id at 425. In this case, the ECJ held that the butter scheme did not violate these
fundamental principles and was therefore valid.
"2 Case 11/70, 1970 ECR 1125, 1972 CMLR 255.
1970 ECR at 1128-29.
" Id at 1134.
,1Case 4/73, 1974 ECR 491.
41 Id at 507.
41

47

Id.

Id at 502-03.
" Weiler, Protection of Fundamental Human Rights at 120 (cited in note 36).
60Id. "The Commission and some of the Advocates General... regard the Convention
in its substantive provisions as binding on the Community Organs; the joint declaration of
the three political institutions did not go so far." Id at 133 (citation omitted).
" Id at 134.
41
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Further developments within the institutions of the European
Economic Community have only enhanced the authority of the
ECHR. On April 27, 1977, the EC adopted a Joint Declaration of
the European Parliament, Council, and Commission, which reaffirmed the Community's commitment to the fundamental freedoms embodied in the Convention on Human Rights.52 Acknowledging that the ECJ recognizes general principles of law and
fundamental rights over and above Community law and that all
the Member States are parties to the ECHR, the Joint Declaration
stated that all three Community bodies stress the importance of
fundamental rights derived from the constitutions of the Member
States and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle was recognized in the "Televi53
sion Without Frontiers" Directive itself.
Given the EC's commitment to fundamental freedoms embodied in the ECHR, and the "Television Without- Frontiers" Directive's recognition of the ECHR's protections of free expression, enactments of the EC clearly must comport with Article 10 of the
ECHR. The Court of Justice has yet to address directly Article 10
and freedom of expression. Therefore, an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the tribunal of the
ECHR, in this area provides useful guidance. Although the ECJ
uses the ECHR only as a framework or starting point and interprets its provisions in light of the Community law, 54 the ECJ will
probably look first to the Court of Human Rights's interpretations
of the ECHR.
B.

The European Convention on Human Rights

The ECHR was enacted on November 4, 1950 and took effect
on September 3, 1953." 5 The enforcement of the Convention takes
place at both national and international levels. In about half of the
" 1977 OJ C103:1.
" Council Dir. 89/552, 1989 OJ at L298:23 (cited in note 1). The Directive states:
[TIhis right [to free movement of services] as applied to the broadcasting and
distribution of television services is also a specific manifestation in Community
law of a more general principle, namely the freedom of expression as enshrined in
Article 10(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ....
Id, preamble, 1989 OJ at L298:23.
" Weiler, Protection of Fundamental Human Rights at 129, 132 (cited in note 36).
" The ECHR went into effect following ratification by 10 signatories. Mark W. Janis
and Richard S. Kay, European Human Rights Law 1 (U of Connecticut Law School Foundation Press, 1990).
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Member States, the Convention enjoys the status of domestic law;
in several others, existing national law mirrors the protections of
the Convention. In states where the Convention's protections have
not been incorporated into domestic law, parties who feel their
rights are being violated have recourse to the international institutions of the ECHR.56 First, one must apply to the European Commission on Human Rights; however, a complaining party can petition the Commission only after he has exhausted all domestic
remedies." The Commission reviews these petitions and forwards
those it believes have merit to the Committee of Ministers, or,
more importantly, to the European Court of Human Rights, with a
report setting forth the Commission's "opinion as to whether the
facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.""8 The Commission's opinion is nonbinding, but may help the parties reach a settlement. If no settlement is reached, an opinion of the Court of Human Rights may
follow.59

The system set up by the European Convention on Human
Rights has enjoyed remarkable success. It provides "not only the
most important body of case law about the substance of international human rights law, but also one of the most refreshing and
interesting examples of an effective international legal process." 0
The case load of the Court of Human Rights has increased steadily
over the years, and, today, the court is more likely to find a State
in violation of one of the provisions of the Convention.61 The

" Thomas Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights in a Nutshell 86-87 (West Publishing Co., 1988).
67 Janis & Kay, European Human Rights Law at 42 (cited in note 55).
"' Id at 44 (quoting European Convention for the.Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, art 31, 213 UNTS 221, ETS 5, UKTS 71 (1953)).
6 Id.
40 Id at xlii.
61 Marc J. Bossuyt and Yolanda Vanden Bosch, Judges and Judgements: 25 Years Judicial Activity of the Court of Strasbourg, 18 Revue Beige De Droit Intl 695, 705-06 (1984-

85).
Bossuyt and Vanden Bosch, in their survey of the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, found that the Court decided 50 cases during the period from 1978 to 1984,
three times the number decided between 1959 and 1976. In addition, the Court found violations of one or more provisions of the Convention by a Member State in 39 of the 50 cases
decided between 1978 and 1984, or 78 percent. This was five times the number of violations

found in the earlier period. Id at 706. See also, Janis & Kay, European Human Rights Law
at 95 (cited in note 55).
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Member States of the Convention generally adhere to the decisions
of the Court of Human Rights. 2
Article 10 of the Convention explicitly protects freedom of
expression:
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting television or cinema enterprises.
2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health and morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
-In several cases, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 10, elaborating a theory of free expression. The
court and the other institutions of the European Convention on
Human Rights have recognized that freedom of expression is necessary as an essential foundation of democracy. In fact, in K. v
Federal Republic of Germany, the European Commission on
Human Rights called freedom of expression "the cornerstone of
the principles of democracy and human rights protected by the
Convention. '6 3 The Court of Human Rights echoed this principle
in The Sunday Times Case. 4 The court stated that freedom of
expression represents "one of the essential foundations of a democratic society" and that protections must extend not only to inof62 This is so even though there is no mandatory enforcement mechanism in the ECHR.
"If the Court finds that the internal law of a State violates the Convention, then the State is
obliged at international law to alter that law. The Court, however, neither itself alters municipal law nor will it instruct the State on how the change in municipal law is to be made."
Janis & Kay, European Human Rights Law at 94 (cited in note 55).
13 Report of the Commission,
106 (May 11, 1984), cited in Dennis Driscoll, Written
Communication on "Freedom of Expression Under Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights," in Proceedings of the Sixth InternationalColloquy About the European Convention on Human Rights 278 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).
64

30 ECHR 5 (1979).
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fensive and noncontroversial information and ideas, but also to
"those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population. "65

However, as the text of Article 10(2) makes clear, this freedom
of expression is subject to a number of exceptions. The exceptions
to Article 10(1) are based on either the well-being of the Community or the countervailing rights of individuals. 6 At first glance,
these exceptions appear sufficiently broad to allow restriction of
almost any expression. In applying these exceptions, however, the
Court of Human Rights has interpreted the exceptions to Article
10 narrowly, ensuring strong protection of free expression. In its
first important ruling on Article 10, the Handyside Case,67 the
Court of Human Rights outlined a three-step approach for reviewing restrictions on free speech. First, the court considers whether
the interference with free expression is "prescribed by law," in order to protect individuals and ensure that the restriction is publicly promulgated and easily recognizable. Second, the court considers whether the interference is in pursuit of a legitimate
objective under Article 10(2). If so, the court considers whether the
' In practice,
interference is "necessary in a democratic society."68
the court has paid little attention to the first two steps. The third
step, whether the restriction is truly "necessary in a democratic
society," proves crucial. The court uses this requirement to ensure
the exceptions in Article 10(2) are narrowly interpreted. 9
Under the third step of the test, the Court of Human Rights
has interpreted "necessity" not as "indispensability," but, instead,
as the looser "pressing social need."7 This definition allows states
some flexibility in protecting the competing rights outlined in Article 10(2), but not so much latitude as to allow derogations that are
merely "admissible" or "ordinary.

71

The analysis of the Court of

Human Rights makes clear that when it considers the possibility
that a national law violates Article 10, the court will apply the test
of whether the measure is necessary in a democratic society within
the context of the Convention, not simply according to the law of
the particular state. Otherwise, every restriction would be valid.7
e' Id at 40.

6 Driscoll, Freedom of Expression Under Article 10 at 288 (cited in note 63).
24 ECHR 1 (1976).
08

Id at 21.

" The Sunday Times Case, 30 ECHR at 41.

Lingens Case, 103 ECHR 11 (1986).
7' Handyside Case, 24 ECHR at 22.
10

Id at 23.
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However, in analyzing whether or not there is a "pressing social need," the Court of Human Rights has consistently allowed
Member States a "margin of appreciation." The margin of appreciation is the deference the court gives to Member State legislation
based upon the assumption that what is necessary in a democratic
society may vary from state to state and that many of the needs of
the State are much more likely to be recognized and understood at
the national level. 3 However, this margin of appreciation must be
balanced by "European supervision," as a check on the power of
national governments to restrict free speech in spite of the protections of the Convention.7 4
The Court of Human Rights must consider several factors
when determining whether or not a restriction is necessary, including the nature of the public interest, the breadth of the interference, the objective pursued, and the practice of other Member
States. 75 In practice, this method of interpretation means that the
margin of appreciation is greater in situations that are more local
in nature. This is particularly true in the case of restrictions aimed
at the protection of public morality. 76 The Court of Human Rights
is much more willing to interfere in the decisions of the state if the
practices are more universal or empirical. If a common ground exists in the Member States to determine which measures are necessary, the court can exercise more supervision and grant less deference to the State. In practice, the court has protected both
political and nonpolitical expression, and has made it clear that a
right to receive information can be as important as the right to
convey information.7 7
C.

The Status of Commercial Speech under the ECHR

Commercial speech should be included within the protection
of free expression embodied in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Nothing in the wording of Article 10 warrants greater restrictions on advertising than on other speech. In
fact, the Court of Human Rights has recognized the principle that

If the only point of reference to determine whether a pressing social need for a regulation exists is whether the State acted in good faith, the ECHR would invalidate few measures, even if they violated the European concept of free expression.
" Janis & Kay, European Human Rights Law at 244 (cited in note 55).
" Lingens Case, 103 ECHR at 25. See also, Handyside Case, 24 ECHR at 23; The
Sunday Times Case, 30 ECHR at 36.
" See, generally, Handyside Case, 24 ECHR 1.
76 Id at 22.
7' The Sunday Times Case, 30 ECHR at 40.
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speech is to be protected regardless of content; 78 this principle supports the position that speech should not be restricted simply because it relates to, proposes, or advocates a commercial transaction. The text of Article 10 supports this conclusion, as it appears
to value the right to receive information as much as the right to
speak.79 Consumers have a definite need for information about the
products that they might purchase. The United States Supreme
Court emphasized this right of the consumer in its early opinions
concerning commercial speech. 0
The case law concerning Article 10, however, has not yet
clearly decided the issue of protection of commercial speech. The
European Court of Human Rights had the opportunity to decide
whether or not commercial speech enjoys the full protection of Article 10 in the Barthold Case.81 That case concerned a Code of Professional Conduct for veterinarians in Hamburg, Germany, which
prohibited its subscribers from advertising or instigating or tolerating publicity in the press.82 Barthold was a veterinarian quoted in
a newspaper article as criticizing the practice of veterinarians who
did not have someone on duty all night. He was subsequently enjoined from reporting in the press or contributing to reports, upon
threat of fine. 3 The Commission report found that the action
against Barthold violated his right to free expression under Article
10."' The Court of Human Rights held that Barthold's comments
were not advertising and were entitled to protection as mainstream
speech which is ordinarily protected by Article 10; the Court explicitly declined to decide whether or not advertising falls within
the scope of freedom of expression. However, the concurring
opinion of Judge Pettiti argues that commercial speech should enjoy Article 10 protection and that Barthold makes an important
86
step in that direction.

11 Handyside Case, 24 ECHR at 23. Indeed, Article 10 protects expressions that "offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population."
" ECHR, Art 10.
80 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 US 748, 763
(1976).
81 90 ECHR 6 (1985).
81 Id at 11.
83 Id at 12.

The European Commission of Human Rights, on Barthold's application, said that his
comments did not fall within what is normally considered commercial speech. The Commission also noted that commercial speech was not excluded from protection under Article 10.
Id at 20.
Barthold Case, 90 ECHR at 20-21.
Id at 31 (Judge Pettiti, concurring).
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For its part, the European Commission of Human Rights
straightforwardly has stated that commercial speech and advertising are protected by the Convention. In the case of X. and Church
of Scientology v Sweden, 7 the Commission said, in response to the
petitioner's application, that commercial speech, although protected by Article 10, does not enjoy the full protection that political speech does."8 The Commission held that the restrictions in
question, which enjoined the applicant from using certain misleading statements in its advertisements for "E-meters," 9 did not violate the provisions of Article 10. This was so because the State
chose the least restrictive means to prevent the use of misleading
advertisements, "namely the prohibition of a certain wording in
the advertisements. '" 0 In practical terms, the Commission's decision simply means that it will be easier for a state to prove that a
restriction is necessary in a democratic society than to show that
commercial speech lies outside the protection of Article 10.91
Another important consideration in the analysis of the validity
of advertising restrictions is the status of commercial speech in the
broadcast media. In the United States, the federal courts have upheld restrictions on television advertising on the theory that the
airwaves are publicly owned and must be operated with the public
interest in mind.92 Similar arguments in the European Economic
Community have been based on the fact that Article 10(1) of the
Convention gives Member States the right to require a license to
16 DR 68 (1979).
"' The Commission stated:
87

Although the Commission is not of the opinion that commercial "speech" as such
is outside the protection conferred by Article 10(1), it considers that the level of
protection must be less than that accorded to the expression of "political" ideas,
in the broadest sense, with which the values underpinning the concept of freedom

of expression in the Convention are chiefly concerned ....
Id at 73.
89 The applicant defined the "E-meter" as a "religious artifact used to measure the
state of electrical characteristics of the 'static field' surrounding the body and believed to
reflect or indicate whether or not the confessing person has been relieved of the spiritual
impediment of his sins." Id at 69. Upon application of the Consumer Ombudsman, the
Swedish Market Court granted an injunction prohibiting the use of certain descriptions of
the E-meter, such as the claim that it is "an invaluable aid to measuring man's mental state
and changes in it." Id at 71.
90 X. and Church of Scientology v Sweden, 16 DR at 74.
1' Id at 73. Four years later, in Liljenberg v Sweden, Admissibility Decision (March 1,
1983), cited in Driscoll, Freedom of Expression Under Article 10 at 284 (cited in note 63),
the Commission reaffirmed its belief that advertising lies within the protection of freedom of
expression. Id.
92 Capital BroadcastingCo. v Mitchell, 333 F Supp 582, 584 (D DC 1971), affd, 405 US
1000 (1972) (upholding ban on television advertising of cigarettes).
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operate a television or radio station. Originally, this provision was
thought to make it easier for the state to restrict speech in these
media. This interpretation of the licensing requirement is no
longer valid. In X. Association v Sweden,98 the Commission on
Human Rights determined that the fact that a Member State may
require a license to operate radio or television stations does not
give the State a blanket right to restrict expression over the airwaves: "[A] State that establishes a system requiring licensing has
special duties to ensure that the rights under Article 10 of the Convention remain protected."9'
III. TOBACCO

AND ALCOHOL ADVERTISING IN THE EC

Free speech doctrine as it concerns commercial speech is not
well developed in Europe. The approach taken by the institutions
of the ECHR closely resembles that adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court when considering advertising and the First Amendment.
The European Commission on Human Rights has held that commercial speech enjoys some protections, although less than other
types of speech such as political expression; it is likely that the
Court of Human Rights will follow suit."5 The United States Supreme Court has taken the same position. For both institutions,
the lesser degree of protection means that the State is more likely
to be able to show a valid interest justifying regulation. In the
United States, the doctrine has developed into a more restrictive
view of commercial speech; a ban on tobacco products advertising
on television and radio has been held constitutional based on the
status of the airwaves as publicly owned and on the state's interest
in protecting the health of its citizens. 6 Based upon the similarities in free speech doctrine as it relates to advertising, one might
believe that European courts would similarly conclude that the
"Television Without Frontiers" Directive's ban on television advertisement of tobacco products and regulation of the content of
alcohol advertisements on television does not violate Article 10 of
the ECHR.
However, several reasons exist why the European courts may
not reach this conclusion. First, even if the Court of Human Rights
would find the provision valid, the Court of Justice is not bound by

9' 28 DR 204 (1982).
" Id at 205.
"
X. and Church of Scientology v Sweden, 16 DR at 73; Driscoll, Freedom of Expression Under Article 10 at 284 (cited in note 63).
9 Capital Broadcasting Co. v Mitchell, 333 F Supp at 586.
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that holding. The Court of Justice could grant more protection to
commercial speech in general, and tobacco advertisements in particular, than do the institutions of the ECHR. Second, the Capital
Broadcasting decision was based largely on the court's holding
that public ownership of the airwaves meant that broadcast media
must be operated in the public interest.9 7 Not only does the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights disregard this rationale,
but the European Commission of Human Rights has also explicitly
rejected it, eliminating one of the main pillars of the Capital
Broadcasting justification.9 8 Third, the general trend of the U.S.
Supreme Court has been to allow more restrictions on advertising
since Central Hudson; the European courts have not shown a tendency to be similarly restrictive.
In order to determine whether the "Television Without Frontiers" Directive violates Article 10 of the ECHR, one must analyze
the restrictions in light of Convention jurisprudence. For the restrictions to be valid, they must meet the requirements of the
three-step test enunciated in Handyside."
Member State legislation banning tobacco product advertising
and regulating alcohol product advertisements is clearly a restriction "prescribed by law," as required by the first step of the
Handyside test. The Court of Human Rights would likely find no
problem with this first level of analysis. The second part of the test
requires that the restriction advance legitimate objectives, those
which are set forth in section 2 of Article 10. The restrictions here,
on tobacco and alcohol advertising, are promulgated to protect the
health of the citizens of the European Economic Community. Protection of health is considered a legitimate goal under the
Convention.
The third prong of the Handyside test presents a more significant hurdle. The state must prove that the restrictions are "necessary in a democratic society." Although the European Court of
Human Rights interprets these exceptions narrowly when considering the validity of restrictions on expression, the standard would
be less strict when the restriction pertains to commercial speech or
advertising; in effect, it will be easier for the state to prove the
Directive's necessity. 10 0

97

Id.

98 X. Association v Sweden, 28 DR at 205.
99 See text at notes 67-69.
'00 X. and Church of Scientology v Sweden, 16 DR at 73.
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The court would likely consider several different factors in order to determine the validity of the restrictions. First, it must decide how much deference to give to the judgment of the legislature
enacting the restrictions. As stated in Handyside and The Sunday
Times Case, the Member States that enact the Directive are entitled to a "margin of appreciation" in determining its necessity, but
the margin requires supervision at the supranational level. The
margin would be larger in matters that are purely local, such as
regulations to protect morality. 01 However, such circumstances do
not exist in the case of cigarette and alcohol advertising restrictions. The effect of cigarette smoking on individuals is the same in
all the Convention's signatories. The legislatures of those States
would not be unduly burdened by being forced to abide by a supranational judgment as to the propriety of the restrictions; no local factors exist that would justify unique restrictions. The court
would not feel itself bound by the legislature's determination that
the restrictions are necessary in its own particular democratic
society.
The Court of Human Rights would then examine the nature
and intrusiveness of the regulations, the importance of the public
interest asserted, and the practices of other Member States. It
might consider statistics concerning the effects of an advertising
ban. It is possible that this analysis would result in the conclusion
that the restrictions are valid: the health of its citizens is a fundamental concern of any government, and all EC Member States ban
tobacco advertisements on television.
Nevertheless, excellent reasons exist to invalidate the regulations on free speech grounds, most of which can be found in U.S.
or European case law on commercial speech. In applying the third
step of the Handyside test, the Court of Human Rights should determine that the ban on television advertisements for cigarettes is
not necessary in a democratic society and therefore invalid as a
violation of the general principle of EC law embodied in Article 10
of the ECHR. 02
The first factor that requires the conclusion that the ban is
invalid is the interest of the consumer and society in the free flow
"o

Handyside Case, 24 ECHR 1, 22 (1976).

'0' This Comment only advocates this approach to article 13 of the Directive as it relates to the ban on tobacco advertising. The regulations on alcohol advertising in article 15
are valid insofar as they attempt to restrict only misleading or fraudulent claims; to the
extent the article 15 regulations go beyond this purpose, the analysis of article 13 applies to
these restrictions as well.
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of commercial information. This interest has been recognized by
both U.S. and European courts."° The Supreme Court, in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumers Council,
Inc., noted that economic information may be more important to a
consumer than political information. 04 A market economy is run
by economic decisions made by the individuals in the market. This
system works best when these economic decisions are based on the
best possible information. Cigarette and alcohol advertisements
serve this function; they provide consumers with product information. Therefore, information such as the brand name, the tar content, and statements as to quality or flavor have at least some
value to those who smoke.
The legislature cannot possibly restrict only valueless advertising by drawing a line between informative, valuable advertising
and that which lacks informational value; the solution must be to
protect all advertising, regardless of content, and let the consumer
decide. 10 5 The approach taken by the State in restricting advertising for products it disapproves of should be rejected. Restrictions
that limit information to individuals simply because they may
make the "wrong" choices are paternalistic. Such an approach assumes that the State knows what is best for its citizens, and denies
the individual the autonomy to choose that which is in his own
best interest. The better alternative is to allow the free flow of
commercial information, trusting consumers to make informed economic decisions. Restrictions limiting information represent an attempt by the government to manipulate behavior by limiting advertising rather than directly regulating the activity or product.
The government is hiding its true purpose from public scrutiny. As
long as a product is legal, advertisements for it should be legal as
well. If the State wants to stop cigarette smoking, it should ban
cigarettes and open its policy to public debate.
The interests of the consumer and society in the free flow of
commercial information create a presumption in favor of the protection of the advertising in question. Additionally, the tobacco advertising ban should be held invalid under Article 10 because none

103

See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc.,

425 US 748 (1976); and The Sunday Times Case, 30 ECHR 5, 40 (1979) (general public
right to receive information).
104 425 US at 763.
'01 This course of action can include allowances for the exclusion of false or fraudulent
advertising, as well as those for illegal products. The theory underlying the protection of
commercial speech does not justify protecting false claims; these will not help a consumer
make an informed decision.
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of the traditional justifications for regulating advertising overcomes this presumption and justifies a ban on all television tobacco
advertisements. If the claims made in the advertisements are false
or fraudulent, they can be regulated, but this does not require a
ban. Moreover, the ban is not an acceptable time, place, and manner restriction on speech:106 the ban is not content-neutral, as it
only applies to one product. Virginia State Board upheld the right
of the government to require warnings, but warnings are not in
question here. Also, the special nature of broadcast media, although apparently a consideration in the United States, will probably not justify a ban under Article 10, in light of the Commission's
10 7
decision in X. Association v Sweden.
Finally, the ban should be rejected because it is disproportionate to the goals sought and will probably be ineffective in attaining
those goals. The broadcast advertisement ban is not the least restrictive means of achieving the EC's goal, an important consideration when analyzing free speech restrictions. Several options exist,
including requiring warnings on tobacco packages and in advertisements, and running anti-smoking advertising spots to counteract
tobacco advertisements. Substantial evidence supports the argument that in this case more speech is the solution; prior to Capital
Broadcasting, anti-smoking commercials led to a decrease in cigarette consumption.' 8 Not only would such methods impose no restrictions on free speech, but they would also enhance debate and
allow individuals to decide on their own course of action.
In fact, a ban on television advertising of tobacco products
may not be effective at all. Studies in the United States consistently indicate that advertising does not lead to an increase in the
consumption of cigarettes.' 0 9 Significantly, the consensus of studies
after the 1971 ban on broadcast advertisements conclude that
"[n]o significant correlation [exists] between aggregate cigarette
advertising and industry demand . . ."0 Instead, advertising
serves only to reallocate market shares of the producers by influencing current consumers to switch brands."' In fact, the ban may
"o According to Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, restrictions which are limited to the
time, place, and manner of the speech are valid. 425 US at 771.
107 28 DR 204 (1982).
Capital Broadcasting Co. v Mitchell, 333 F Supp 582, 588, 589 n 18 (Wright
dissenting).
.o Michael J. Garrison, Should all Cigarette Advertising Be Banned? A First Amendment and Public Policy Issue, 25 Am Bus L J 169, 178 (1987).
110 Id at 179.
,l Id at 169-70.
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be detrimental by restricting advertisements that encourage a
change to less harmful cigarettes, such as low-tar brands. In light
of these doubts about the effectiveness of a ban on television advertising of tobacco products, the reasons supporting restrictions
fail to overcome the presumption that advertisements are protected free speech.
CONCLUSION

The ECJ has incorporated general principles of law into Community law. Such principles include the right to free expression as
embodied in ECHR Article 10. As a result, measures that restrict
speech must be consistent with the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights. The "Television Without Frontiers"
Directive runs afoul of this provision. Under the three-part test established by the Court of Human Rights, the restrictions must be
necessary in a democratic society in order to be justified under Article 10(2). The ban on tobacco advertising does not meet this burden. The interest of consumers in information about cigarettes, the
existence of less restrictive alternatives to the ban, and the likelihood that the restrictions will not help further the goals of the EC,
require the conclusion that the ban is an invalid restriction on free
speech.

